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Q

uid pro quo behavior—that is, reciprocating behavior in
kind—is present in all human moral codes (1–4). The
evaluation, memory, and communication functions of the human
brain promote exchange at a scale far greater than that of other
primates (5). Humans identify and remember cheaters and
verbally communicate knowledge of cheating to third parties (6,
7). Punishing norm violations or avoiding people with a reputation for cheating sustains reciprocity (8–18).
But can the human brain alone provide a complete explanation for how memory enables more complex forms of reciprocal
exchange among humans? The unaided human neocortex is
constrained in sustaining social exchange in interactions that are
complex, numerous, and heterogeneous (19). Yet, casual observation suggests that human economic institutions bind complete
strangers together in vast networks of interaction known as
‘‘organizations’’ and ‘‘markets.’’ For example, eBay employs
thousands to operate global electronic markets that are used by
millions of people (20). eBay participants likely trust that a
proposed transaction can be completed on mutually beneficial
terms in part because of eBay’s extensive database of individual
trading histories (a form of recordkeeping). These records of
past transaction histories can allow reputations for trustworthiness to form, with the ultimate result that sellers with favorable
histories receive higher prices (21, 22).
Computerized recordkeeping in online markets is the latest
step in a long technological history. Humans have created and
stored transactional records outside their brains for at least
10,000 years (23). Archaeologists have discovered nonwritten
transactional artifacts that date to 8,000 BCE and have documented that the independent invention of writing by the Sumerians (ca 3,200 BCE) was for keeping records (24, 25). Both of
these innovations appeared concurrently with scale expansions
in human settlements. Anthropologists demonstrate that symbolic artifacts serving a memory function are often a central
feature of complex exchange in primitive societies (26). Scholars
have suggested that the recordkeeping of modern accounting
provides just such a memory aid (27, 28). This evidence suggests
the possibility that recordkeeping is a culturally evolved instituwww.pnas.org兾cgi兾doi兾10.1073兾pnas.0811967106

tion that complements the brain’s ability to recall noncooperative behaviors and sustains reciprocal exchange in larger, morecomplex groups (29–31).
Economists have long recognized the central role of exchange,
but have no scientific explanation and evidence for whether and
how recordkeeping promotes reciprocity (32). We posit that
recordkeeping helps foster reciprocity in complex settings where
neuronal memory is implicitly taxed. The archaeological evidence noted above and the ubiquity of the receipt in developed
economies suggests this is plausible (33). We test several hypotheses about the relation between exchange and recordkeeping by using a repeated trust game experiment (34–36). Our
experimental design allows us to directly test whether the
possibility of keeping records alters individual behavior and
leads to differences in reputation formation, decision coordination, and economic histories.
Experimental Design
We conducted an experiment, in which we varied both the complexity of economic exchange and the availability of recordkeeping,
to examine the role of recordkeeping in shaping an economy’s
history of reciprocal exchange. A single-dyad trust game pairs one
investor anonymously with one trustee (34–36). In each period, the
investor receives 10 units of experimental currency, which are
referred to as lira, and decides how many lira of the 10 (in whole
numbers) to send to the trustee. This investment generates gains
because it is tripled en route to the trustee. The trustee then decides
how much of the amount received to send back to the investor. The
investor’s return is thus determined by the trustee’s decision. A
large body of experimental evidence shows that, even in one-shot
play, investors tend to make positive investments and trustees tend
to reciprocate by sending back amounts that provide a positive net
return to the investor (37, 38).
To capture complexity of economic exchange, the single-dyad
trust game is extended to a multi-dyad trust game. In the
multi-dyad economy, each subject simultaneously plays a trust
game with 5 different trading partners. Every investor has 5
separate endowments of 10 lira, one for each trustee. For each
10-lira endowment, the investor decides how much of that
amount to send to the respective trustee. Each trustee receives
5 tripled amounts, one from each of the 5 investors. Every trustee
then decides, for each investor, how much of the amount received
to send back.
We ran both the multi-dyad and single-dyad trust games for
two types of economies: one in which subjects could choose to
keep records and one in which recordkeeping was not possible.
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We experimentally demonstrate a causal link between recordkeeping
and reciprocal exchange. Recordkeeping improves memory of past
interactions in a complex exchange environment, which promotes
reputation formation and decision coordination. Economies with
recordkeeping exhibit a beneficially altered economic history where
the risks of exchanging with strangers are substantially lessened. Our
findings are consistent with prior assertions that complex and extensive reciprocity requires sophisticated memory to store information
on past transactions. We offer insights on this research by scientifically demonstrating that reciprocity can be facilitated by information
storage external to the brain. This is consistent with the archaeological record, which suggests that prehistoric transaction records and
the invention of writing for recordkeeping were linked to increased
complexity in human interaction.

We implemented a repeated game by repeating the single-period
game 10 times with new endowments of 10 lira each time (36).
Repeated interaction allows a sequential history of exchange to
unfold wherein subjects can condition their choices on the
memory of past outcomes. Memory of past outcomes can also be
used to evaluate the effectiveness of choices in light of partners’
responses.
A key feature of our design is that records were kept only when
a subject had access to the recordkeeping technology and chose to
use it. When recordkeeping was available, 78% of subjects in the
multi-dyad condition kept records compared with 50% in the
single-dyad condition; this effect starts in the first period of play (see
SI). This evidence is consistent with our expectation that greater
cognitive demands in the multi-dyad condition manifest themselves
in increased use of the recordkeeping technology. We turn now to
our major findings, which pertain to the multi-dyad economies;
specifically, that the possibility of recordkeeping alters economic
agents’ memories and behaviors, thus creating different economic
histories. Accordingly, we omit further discussion of the single-dyad
economies (see SI).
Hypotheses and Data Analysis
In a multi-dyad setting, we expect that trading partners can better
acquire and sustain reputations for trustworthy behavior with
recordkeeping than without because it improves recall of past
interactions. Reputation is an unobservable construct denoting an
individual’s beliefs about the expected behavior of a trading partner. For example, if a trustee earns a reputation for trustworthiness
in the investor’s mind, the investor will expect the trustee to
reciprocate a large investment by providing a positive net return to
the investor. The trustee’s reputation will be built on what the
investor recalls of previous interactions with that trustee. If recordkeeping promotes more effective recall of the past, it will promote
reputation formation and result in increased coordination of trading partners’ behavior (i.e., greater reciprocity). Thus, a different
history of exchange decisions between the partners will emerge. We
develop each hypothesis as we present our findings in the following
subsections.
Recordkeeping Promotes Reputation Formation. Our first hypothe-

Fig. 1. Correlation between decisions and image scores across time. (A)
Mean session correlation of period t Investment with period t-1 trustee image
score. Shown is the average of session mean correlation between period t
investment and the period t-1 trustee image score for periods 2 through 10 for
the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping economies. (B) Mean session correlation of period t ROE with period t investor image score. Shown is the average
of session mean correlation between period t return on endowment and the
period t investor image score for periods 1 through 10 for the recordkeeping
and no recordkeeping economies.

sis is that improved memory from recordkeeping promotes
reputation formation. As noted above, reputation refers to an
individual’s unobservable beliefs about a trading partner’s likely
behavior. Observing an individual’s behavior leads to beliefs that
constitute that individual’s reputation. Because recordkeeping
allows subjects to better recall partners’ past decisions, we expect
subjects in a recordkeeping economy will be able to form clearer
mental categorizations of specific partners’ reputations as play
unfolds.
Testing this hypothesis requires an empirical proxy for the
unobservable construct of reputation. One proxy for reputation
is an image score that increases (decreases) when a person takes
an action that is likely to be interpreted as favorable (unfavorable) by another person developing beliefs about the actor’s
future behavior. An image score provides a parsimonious cumulative measure of reputation based on the complete history of
observed interactions. Image scores have been used in human
experiments and have been useful in categorizing non-primate
behavior (11–13, 39). We expect subjects’ decisions to be more
strongly associated with image scores (which we construct based
on their partners’ past decisions) for recordkeeping economies
than for no recordkeeping economies. We thus predict that the
positive correlation between partners’ image scores and subject
decisions will increase with recordkeeping and become more
pronounced as the history of exchange unfolds.
We computed a trustee’s cumulative image score with a
specific investor in period t based on all prior trustee return
decisions with that investor—that is, returns up to and including

period t-1 (for more specific details on the calculation, see SI).
The trustee’s image score increases by 2 points (1 point) in any
period where the trustee sends back an amount that exceeds
investor’s investment by a large (small) amount. Zero points are
added to the trustee image score when the trustee has received
nothing from the investor, and thus has no decision to make. The
trustee’s image score declines by 2 points (1 point) when the
amount sent back by the trustee yields the investor a large (small)
negative return in relation to the amount invested. We use image
scores based on simple classifications of partner behavior to
enhance consistency with prior studies of reputation in humans
based on image scoring (11–13).
The mean correlations between investments and trustee image
scores are more positive for the recordkeeping economies in
every period, and this difference widens in later rounds (Fig. 1A).
For example, the average of the mean (across 5 sessions)
correlation for investments in periods 2–5 and the one-period
lagged trustee image score is 0.625 for the recordkeeping
economy compared with 0.379 for the no recordkeeping economy. This difference is significant at P ⫽ 0.028 (Mann–Whitney
test, one-tailed). The mean correlation for the recordkeeping
economy increases to 0.740 (from 0.625) in periods 6–10 whereas
the mean correlation for the no recordkeeping economy declines
to 0.365 (from 0.379) in periods 6–10. The difference in mean
correlations between the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping

1010 兩 www.pnas.org兾cgi兾doi兾10.1073兾pnas.0811967106
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Recordkeeping Spontaneously Increases Investor-Trustee Coordination. One consequence of a link between reputation and deci-

sions is that investors’ and trustees’ actions will become increasingly coordinated. That is, investors and trustees will come to be
characterized by stronger mutually reinforcing behaviors when
recordkeeping is possible. Investors will make larger investments
in those trustees who have reciprocated their trust and trustees
will more likely make equitable divisions after the investor has
made a large investment. Coordinated reciprocal action aligns
the behaviors of the investor and trustee and spontaneously
increases convergence of each other’s reputations. This coordination is consistent with balanced reciprocity where choice
increasingly becomes conditioned on others’ past behavior (40,
41). This hypothesis suggests that the correlation between investor and trustee image scores will increase through time and
be more pronounced when recordkeeping is possible.
To test this hypothesis, we computed correlations between the
investor’s cumulative image score and the trustee’s cumulative
image score for every period in each multi-dyad economy (Fig.
2). The graph shows the mean (across sessions) correlation
between investor and trustee image scores for the recordkeeping
and no recordkeeping economies for each period. Image scores
are calculated as described in the prior subsection. The mean
correlation between investor and trustee image scores monotonically increases in every period for the recordkeeping economies but not for the no recordkeeping economies, for example,
the no recordkeeping correlations in periods 8 and 10 are slightly
lower than those in periods 7 and 9, respectively. The mean
correlation for the recordkeeping economies is over twice as
large as that of the no recordkeeping economies in both the 1–5
and 6–10 subperiods. Differences in mean correlations are
significant at P less than or equal to 0.05 (Mann–Whitney test,
one-tailed).
Recordkeeping Promotes Reputation Formation Through Improved
Memory. The causal basis for our hypotheses is that recordkeep-

ing promotes reputation formation through better recall. As a
result, subjects’ choices in a recordkeeping economy incorporate
a longer history of past exchanges. Our image score results do not
allow us to identify these effects because a relation between
image scores and subject choices could result from either the
recent history of a partner’s behavior or choices made in the
Basu et al.

Fig. 2. Mean session contemporaneous correlation of investor and trustee
image score. Shown is the average of session mean correlation between
period t investor image score and the period t trustee image score for periods
1 through 10 for the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping economies.

more distant past. Thus, it is necessary to decompose image
scores and examine the relation between score components and
partners’ behavior. We compare the correlations of subjects’
choices with partners’ future choices and expect that these
correlations will remain more positive in later periods for the
recordkeeping economies versus the no recordkeeping economies as the history of exchange unfolds.
A trustee’s decision in an early period remains relevant to
subsequent investor decisions longer in the recordkeeping economies than in the no recordkeeping economies (Fig. 3 A and B).
The line beginning at the leftmost point in Fig. 3A plots the mean
correlation between period 1 ROE and period t ⫹ 1 investments
(t ⫽ 1, 2, …9) for the recordkeeping economies. The analogous
line in Fig. 3B applies to period 1 ROE for the no recordkeeping
economies. The mean correlation between period 1 ROE and
period 2 investments equals 0.597 for the recordkeeping economies and 0.396 for the no recordkeeping economies, and both
economies’ period 1 ROE correlation with period 6 investments
still exceeds 0.2. However, by period 10, the mean correlation
between period 1 ROE and investment for the no recordkeeping
economies has fallen to 0.044 whereas the same correlation for
the recordkeeping economies has remained strongly positive
(equal to 0.349).
Moving rightward across both figures, the next line shows the
mean correlations applicable to period 2 ROE, period 3 ROE,
and so forth. Two patterns are apparent in these plots. First, the
lines for the recordkeeping economies are flatter than those of
the no recordkeeping economies, which suggests that a trustee’s
decisions continue to persistently affect investors’ future choices.
Second, successive lines for the recordkeeping economies tend
to shift upward whereas no such effect is obvious for the no
recordkeeping economies. This indicates that trustee decisions
in a recordkeeping economy carry with them an expanding
cumulative information set that is confirmed subsequently by
investors’ future behavior.
Investor decisions also remain correlated with future trustee
ROE choices for a longer time in the recordkeeping economy,
and this difference widens as time passes (Fig. 3 C and D). As
was the case for trustee ROE decisions, the time-series correlation plots generally shift upward for later periods in the
recordkeeping economies (Fig. 3C) whereas the plots for the no
recordkeeping economies are generally ⬍0.2 (Fig. 3D). The
PNAS 兩 January 27, 2009 兩 vol. 106 兩 no. 4 兩 1011
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economies for periods 6–10 is significant at P ⫽ 0.004 (Mann–
Whitney test, one-tailed).
We computed changes in an investor’s image score for a
specific trustee based on amounts invested in a given period. An
investor’s cumulative image score increased by 2 points (1 point)
in a period when a very large (large) investment was made.
Modest investments of 5 lira resulted in no change whereas small
(very small) investments resulted in image score declines of 1
point (2 points).
As with our results on trustee image scores, average contemporaneous correlations between investor image scores and the
return on endowment (ROE) provided by the trustee are more
positive for the recordkeeping economies than for the no
recordkeeping economies in all 10 periods (Fig. 1B). ROE is a
ratio equal to the investor’s payoff from that trustee’s dyad in
that period relative to the investor’s endowment for that specific
trustee. The mean correlation between ROE and the investor’s
image score is 0.364 for the recordkeeping economies in periods
1–5, and increases to 0.615 in periods 6–10. The mean correlation for the no recordkeeping economies is lower than that of the
recordkeeping economies in periods 1–5 (0.169 versus 0.364),
and remains virtually unchanged in periods 6–10. The difference
in mean correlation between the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping economies is significant at P less than or equal to 0.05
for both subperiods (Mann–Whitney test, one-tailed).

Fig. 3. Correlations between investor and trustee behavior across time. (A) Mean session correlation of ROE with future investments–recordkeeping. Shown
is the average of session mean correlation between current period return on endowment and future period investments for periods 1 through 9 in the
recordkeeping economies. (B) Mean session correlation of ROE with future investments–no recordkeeping. Shown is the average of session mean correlation
between current period return on endowment and future period investments for periods 1 through 9 in the no recordkeeping economies. (C) Mean session
correlation of current investment with future ROE–recordkeeping. Shown is the average of session mean correlation between current period investment and
future return on endowment for periods 1 through 10 in the recordkeeping economies. (D) Mean session correlation of current investment with future ROE–no
recordkeeping. Shown is the average of session mean correlation between current period investment and future return on endowment for periods 1 through
10 in the no recordkeeping economies. (E) Mean session correlation of period 10 investment with past ROE. Shown is the average of session mean correlation
between period 10 investment and the past return on endowment for periods 1 through 9 in the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping economies. (F) Mean
session correlation of period 10 ROE with past investment. Shown is the average of session mean correlation between period 10 return on endowment and the
past investment for periods 1 through 10 in the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping economies.

discontinuity in Fig. 3D for period 9 results from the behavior of
two trustees who returned relatively low amounts after receiving
large investments in period 9. These trustees may have guessed
that the session was nearing an end; thus, the pattern could
reflect end-of-game behavior.
The results in Fig. 3 A–D suggest that investor and trustee
decisions carry with them a longer history of past exchanges in
a recordkeeping economy. For investors, this is best illustrated
by more positive mean correlations (across sessions) between
investors’ period 10 investments and past ROE’s in the recordkeeping economies than in the no recordkeeping economies
(Fig. 3E). The mean correlation for recordkeeping economies
exceeds 0.3 for all periods, and is ⬎0.70 for ROE in periods 7
through 9. In contrast, for no recordkeeping economies, the
mean correlation between period 10 investment and past ROE
exceeds 0.30 only for period 9 ROE. We compare the distributions of session-wide correlations in the 5 recordkeeping vs. 5 no
recordkeeping economies, both in subperiods 1–5 and subperiods 6–9. The differences in mean correlation are significant at
P less than or equal to 0.05 (one-tailed) in both subperiods.
A similar, but somewhat weaker, result holds when correlating
period 10 ROE provided by the trustee with the investor’s prior
investments with that trustee (Fig. 3F). The mean correlation in
the recordkeeping economies is more positive than the no
recordkeeping economies in every period. A Mann–Whitney test
rejects the null at P less than or equal to 0.05 for investments in
periods 6–10.
Recordkeeping Beneficially Alters Economic History. We will first
demonstrate that subjects’ decisions are different in a record1012 兩 www.pnas.org兾cgi兾doi兾10.1073兾pnas.0811967106

keeping economy and then demonstrate that risk reduction
benefits attach to these different decisions.
At the heart of reputation stories for reciprocity is that a
decision maker discriminates in favor of those trading partners
who have built a favorable reputation for reciprocity. In our
experiment, discrimination by an investor will be reflected in
investment levels that vary across trustees. A direct measure of
investor discrimination is the spread between an investor’s
maximum and minimum investments in a given period. We
expect the spread between maximum and minimum investments
will be more positive with recordkeeping and any differences in
investor spreads will be greater for later periods.
We compared the mean investment spread for the 5 recordkeeping and the 5 no recordkeeping economies for periods 1
through 5 and periods 6 through 10. Differences in mean spreads
in periods 1–5 are not statistically distinguishable for the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping economies. The mean spread
in periods 6 through 10 equals 6.77 lira in the recordkeeping
economies compared with 5.60 lira in the no recordkeeping
economies; this difference is significantly different from zero at
P ⬍ 0.05 based on a one-tailed Mann–Whitney test (see first row
of Table 1). The second row reveals that the significant mean
difference in investment spreads for periods 6 through 10 is not
the result of more frequent maximum investments. Instead, the
rate at which investors make investments of zero lira increases
over time to a greater degree in the recordkeeping economies
(see third row in Table 1).
The frequency of ‘‘fair’’ return decisions by trustees is significantly higher in the recordkeeping economies in both subperiBasu et al.

Table 1. Recordkeeping alters economic history
Periods 1–5
Investor and trustee decisions
Mean of Economy’s Average Investment Spread
Mean of Economy’s % of Max Investments
Mean of Economy’s % of Zero Investments
Mean of Economy’s Trustee Fair Returns as % of Positive Investments

RK
4.15
34.1
9.8
25.8

No RK
3.95
14.7*
12.3
10.0**

Periods 6–10

Change (⫹/⫺)

RK

No RK

RK

6.77
34.7
26.9
33.9

5.60**

⫹2.62
⫹0.6
⫹17.1
⫹8.1

18.9*
21.0**
15.4**

No RK
⫹1.65
⫹4.2
⫹8.7**
⫹5.4

*, Significant at 0.01 level based on a one-tailed Mann–Whitney test.
**, Significant at 0.05 level based on a one-tailed Mann–Whitney test.
***, Significant at 0.10 level based on a one-tailed Mann–Whitney test.

Table 2). However, the difference in mean coefficient of variation in periods 6–10 between the recordkeeping economies
(0.221) and the no recordkeeping economies (0.358) is significant at P ⫽ 0.004.
Because the coefficient of variation controls for mean returns,
lower investor risk in the recordkeeping economies is not likely
accompanied by a disproportionate sacrifice in the form of lower
investor returns and dollar payoffs. Consistent with this, our data
indicate that investors earn greater average rates of return in the
recordkeeping economy (18.7%) than in the no recordkeeping
economy (7.3%) for periods 6–10 (see second row of Table 2).
This difference is significant at P ⬍0.001 (one-tailed).
Discussion and Conclusions
Experiments offer insight into how worlds are transformed by
human institutions. We experimentally demonstrate that voluntary use of recordkeeping alters the character of reciprocal
exchange. Recordkeeping enables better recall of past outcomes,
promotes reputation formation, and encourages spontaneous
coordination of economic decisions. The ultimate effect is that
recordkeeping alters an economy’s history and encourages exchange by reducing the risk of loss from transacting with
strangers. Our findings are important because they support the
hypothesis that the simple ability to record exchange externally
can complement the brain’s memory resources in consummating
beneficial exchange with strangers. This implies that recordkeeping external to the brain, which is observed early in human
history, may store the information necessary for the vast expansion of reciprocity and cooperation that characterizes modern
human societies (1–4, 23–25). Further examination of this
implication may prove fertile ground for future research. Agentbased modeling and other analytic modeling methods will likely
be useful in unraveling the dynamic processes through which
recordkeeping and other institutions coevolve with the economic
development of society. Thus, future research on how recordkeeping (working in tandem with institutions to sanction and
broadcast acts of deception) sustains and expands reciprocity
promises a clearer understanding of why humans have built
cooperative networks that dwarf those of other species in scale
and complexity (11–14, 19, 29–31).
Methods

Fig. 4. Mean coefficient of variation for investor rates of return for a given
type of economy (RK and No RK). Shown is the average of session mean
coefficient of variation for period t investor rates of return calculated at the
dyad level for periods 1 through 10 for the recordkeeping and no recordkeeping economies.

Basu et al.

We conducted our experiment at the Center for Interuniversity Research and
Analysis on Organization (CIRANO) in Montreal, Canada. CIRANO staff recruited
subjects and ran 20 sessions (5 sessions for each experimental condition). Subjects
(200) were recruited by CIRANO from a standard subject pool and remain anonymous to the authors. Each condition-specific experiment-session included 10
subjects, each of whom was randomly assigned to be either an investor or a
trustee (with the restriction that each session contains 5 investors and 5 trustees).
Further, each experiment-session included 10 trading periods. Subjects were not
informed of the number of periods to mitigate end-game effects, although they
were informed via recruiting materials that the experiment would last ⬇2 h. No
experiment-session lasted longer than 90 min.
Subjects received and read written experiment instructions. Subjects then
took a quiz to ensure sufficient understanding of experiment instructions.
PNAS 兩 January 27, 2009 兩 vol. 106 兩 no. 4 兩 1013
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ods (see the fourth row of Table 1). For present purposes, we
define a ‘‘fair’’ return by the trustee as one where the amount
received is split evenly between the investor and the trustee.
Under this definition, at least 25% of all trustee return decisions
are classified as fair in both subperiods for the recordkeeping
economies compared with no ⬎17% in the no recordkeeping
economies. The difference in the frequency of fair return
decisions is significant in both subperiods (P ⬍ 0.05). Thus, the
evidence in Table 1 demonstrates that the history of exchange
decisions is different in a recordkeeping economy.
We next demonstrate that recordkeeping is associated with
beneficial risk reduction. We focus on investor risk rather than
trustee risk because as the first mover the investor incurs greater
risk. Analysis of trustee risk is included in the SI. The risk to an
investor in the trust game is the variation in the investor’s return.
We calculated this return as the ratio of the investor’s total
payoff relative to his/her initial endowment in every period for
each dyad. The cross-sectional coefficient of variation of this
ratio is our measure of investment risk present in a given type of
economy (recordkeeping versus no recordkeeping) at a given
point in time.
The recordkeeping economy’s investment risk per unit of
return is lower than that of the no recordkeeping economy after
the first period (Fig. 4). The average of mean dyad-level coefficient of variation in periods 1–5 is 0.324 (0.383) for the
recordkeeping (no recordkeeping) economies; this difference is
not significant at P less than or equal to 0.10 (see first row of

Table 2. Recordkeeping lessens exchange risk
Periods 1–5
Investor risk
Average of period mean coefficient of variation
for dyad-level returns
Mean investor return, %

RK
0.324
16.7

No RK
0.384
10.2

Periods 6–10

Change (⫹/⫺)

RK

No RK

RK

No RK

0.221

0.358*

⫺0.103

⫺0.026

7.3*

⫹2.0

⫺2.9

18.7

*, Significant at 0.01 level based on a one-tailed Mann–Whitney test. **, Significant at 0.05 level based on a one-tailed Mann–Whitney
test. ***, Significant at 0.10 level based on a one-tailed Mann–Whitney test.
Subjects interacted anonymously over a local computer network facilitated by
z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments) software (42).
Each trading period began with investors deciding how much of 10 units of
experiment-currency (i.e., lira) to invest in the paired trustee(s). In the multidyad conditions, investors had 5 separate endowments of 10 lira for each of
the 5 trustees with whom the investor was paired. All investors’ investment
decisions were required before trustees received investment information.
Similarly, all trustees’ ‘‘return’’ decisions were required before both player
types received feedback information. Investors received feedback information in the form of what each paired-trustee sent. Trustees received feedback
information in the form of what was received from each paired-investor (i.e.,
the tripled investment amount). The next trading period began once all
subjects confirmed they were finished reviewing feedback.
At the end of the tenth trading period, subjects completed a short questionnaire containing strategy-oriented and demographic questions. The lira
earned for all periods was summed and converted to cash at a rate that varies
by experimental condition to equalize the maximum possible payout per
subject across exchange-conditions (C$0.04 per lira in the multi-dyad condition and C$0.20 per lira in the single dyad condition). Because each subject in
the multi-dyad setting participates in 5 dyads each period, we set the conversion rate in the multi-dyad setting at 1/5 that of the single-dyad setting.
In recordkeeping conditions, we provided a text-based electronic notebook to subjects. The notebook is a blank textbox, situated at the right side of
the computer screen. The Textbox program recorded the contents of the

textbox every 5 s for the length of the experiment-session, providing data
regarding the timing, content, and extent of recordkeeping engaged in by
individual subjects. This program is the only method of personal external
recordkeeping available to subjects. Subjects did not have access to paper and
pencils, nor could they use computer programs other than z-Tree and Textbox
(the latter available for only those subjects in the recordkeeping condition).
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